University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2013

Social Movements as Constituent Power The
Italian Struggle for the Commons
Ugo Mattei
UC Hastings College of the Law, matteiu@uchastings.edu

Saki Bailey

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Ugo Mattei and Saki Bailey, Social Movements as Constituent Power The Italian Struggle for the Commons, 20 Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies 965 (2013).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1150

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CONSTITUENT POWER: THE ITALIAN
STRUGGLE FOR THE COMMONS
Saki Bailey1 & Ugo Mattei2
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the June 2011 Italian National Referendum opposing the
compulsory privatization of public utilities, profit on tap water, and nuclear program, a
constitutional moment3 has been unfolding in Italy. The Referendum prompted a political
clash of a constitutional nature between the neoliberal state and the “people,” united
through a social movement under the banner of the “beni comuni” or common goods
movement. The “political commons”4 in the Italian context has emerged as a strategy for
reclaiming fundamental common goods (like water, culture, and education) and the
democratic processes and spaces, which govern their access and distribution. This
commons movement, as will be argued in this paper, is an instance of one of the many
struggles taking place throughout the world; from the Bolivian Andes to the Indian
Himalayas, local people are pushing out the state and predatory multinationals acting in
collusion to enclose common spaces and resources for the benefit of private profit. These
individual struggles for the commons are linking together through global networks and
are emerging as a transnational social movement challenging the top down economic
constitutionalism of the WTO, and what has been dubbed the “troika”: European Central
Bank, European Commission, and IMF.
The common goods movement in Italy was born out of the concerted action of a
number of groups within civil society combatting neoliberal privatization: the work of
scholars in the Accademia di Lincei (the most prestigious research institute in Italy)
involved in drafting proposed reforms to the civil code to protect common spaces; the
work of lawyers undertaking an impressive range of activities: from fighting against
privatization in courts both on the constitutional and municipal levels to assisting
communities to organize into legal associations like foundations (in the case of national
theaters) to prevent privatizations; the work of activists within the official water forum
who rallied public support for the referendum; and finally the important work
accomplished by regular citizens and local communities reclaiming nature, culture, labor
and education as commons from collusive corporate and state actors. The success of this
movement was demonstrated in the unexpected victory of the “water referendum,” where
in an unprecedented manner over 27 million Italians turned out to vote with over 95%
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voting against privatization, accomplishing the first 50% quorum in Italy in over 16
years.5 This major victory produced an extreme counter reaction by the neoliberal
opposition fearful of popular revolt, leading to the modification of provisions of the
Constitution of 1948 with a large majority vote by a corrupt Parliament (no party can
currently win a majority), to prevent another popular referendum from taking place.6
A major clash between representative and direct democracy is occurring, which
has led to the occupation of not only squares, as in Greece and Spain, but occupations of
actual sites of privatizations, such as national theaters like the Teatro Valle and
development projects, like the high speed train in the Susa Valley. Recently the ongoing
struggle was settled by the Constitutional Court in a landmark decision7 that shielded
referendum results beyond the reach of Parliamentary legislation, thus offering a major
constitutional source of legitimacy to the so called beni comuni movement fighting the
neoliberal strategy of the government. Since the Referendum results the former
Government deemed untrustworthy by the European neoliberal establishment, was forced
to resign in November 2011. A new, so called, “technical” Government, headed by a
former European Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, was formed to carry out the
neoliberal policy mandate of the troika and today enjoys an overwhelming economic
emergency based majority in the Parliament. This quite dramatic and sudden turn of
events is a clear example of the marginalization of “the people” in the current phase of
global capitalism, and poses significant questions as to the meaning of state sovereignty
and the status of constituent power today.
The Italian beni comuni movement is a powerful example of the way in which
social movements are emerging as an important form of constituent power on both
national & supranational levels, serving not only to enforce the protections and
guarantees of national constitutions but also, in the context of the decline of the nation
state, as counter hegemonic bottom up forces against the top down economic
constitutionalism of international economic institutions. This paper is divided into three
parts: Part I attempts to make the case that social movements are emerging as an
important form of constituent power offering: 1) alternatives which challenge the
assumptions underpinning the liberal constitutional form namely of private property, and
2) a much needed channel for politics where representative government politics and state
politics have failed to protect the public from predatory private actors. Part II In a
participant observation by one of the authors,8 explores constitutionalism on the level of
practice as opposed to a priori theories, through the national constituent role played by
the beni comuni social movement in upholding the protections and guarantees of the
Italian Constitution. Finally, Part III analyzes the supranational constitutional process and
5
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considers the beni comuni movement as part of an oppositional global constituency
challenging the top down imposition of global economic constitutionalism and reclaiming
the “commons” from predatory multinational actors through bottom up societal
constitutionalism.
I. THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUENT POWER
The idea that social movements, made up of civil society groups, as “constituent
power,” remains a contested claim. Classical constitutional theory designates the capacity
for “constituent power” to the “people” through the concept of popular sovereignty,
however it is assumed that it is only legitimately exercised through representative
democracy. There is an inherent tautology or “paradox” in this designation, which has
perplexed constitutional theory from its origins, and as most legal scholars know, there is
a long debate on the controversy stretching from Hobbes, Rousseau, Hume, Bentham,
Burke, to name a few, and most recently Hardt & Negri with the concept of “Multitude.”
The paradox is often referred to as the problem of the “non foundational foundations of
law”9 and may explain the exclusion of civil society actors as “constituent power” in
traditional constitutional theory. This problem of the “non foundational foundations of
law” appeared in legal theory in the shift from natural law to positivism, which produced
a kind of chicken/egg problem for constitutionalism: what came first the constitution or
the state? Constituent power or the constitution? How can the state produce
constitutional law when it is the constitution itself which produces the state? How can a
“social contract” between the “people” with “government” exist prior to the making of
the social contract itself? Part of the difficulty clearly lies in defining and naming the
entities between whom the social contract is made, and on which the idea of
constitutionalism is founded. Ruth Buchanan describes this paradox as a product of a
myth which positivists have accepted as a concrete reality.
A constitution is essentially an originary narrative, in that it offers an account of the source of both
legal and political authority. It does so by purporting to ground that authority in the political will
of a 'people' understood to be capable of acting as a unified entity. The 'people,' however, cannot
come into existence as such until after the founding inaugurated by the constitution. The
constitutional 'moment', then, is always a type of 'pious fiction' .10

As Buchanan explains “the people” are a product of the constitution itself, a
unified political entity constituted by the constitutional form, not as something which has
an apriori existence. The paradox of the constitutional narrative is that “the origin has to
'be' before and after the point of origination.”11 This myth has been critiqued most
recently by Hardt and Negri, whom argue that the unified political entity of the “people”
facilitates the cancellation of the pre-political subjectivity of the “multitude,” which in
turn is functional to the merger of the popular political will into the will of the sovereign,
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robbing the “multitude” of their ongoing constituent role and power in the constitutional
process.
“Hobbes challenges the existence of the multitude on more directly political grounds. The
multitude is not a political body, he maintains, and for it to become political it must become a
people, which is defined by its unity of will and action. The many, in other words, must be
reduced to one, thereby negating the essence of the multitude itself: “When the multitude is united
into a body politic, and thereby are a people...and their wills virtually in the sovereign, there the
rights and demands of the particulars do cease; and he or they that have the sovereign power, doth
for them all demand and vindicate under the name of his, that which before they call in the plural,
theirs.”12

The “social contract,” which results after negating all claims and existence of the
multitude is a contract of the sovereign with himself, leaving the sovereign free to pursue
his own interests while maintaining the appearance of popular sovereignty as a
counterbalancing check to power. But who/what is the multitude and who/what is the
sovereign? There is an entire field of scholarship, which we will not attempt to
synthesize, on the evolving concept of the sovereign: from monarch, to the third estate, to
the modern state and the shifting raison d'etat from pastoralism to neoliberal
governmentality.13 However, for our purposes, we will narrow the issue to the
anticipated ongoing constituent role for both the political people and the raw constituent
power of “multitude” in the constitutional process. Hardt and Negri, describe the
Multitude as “unformed constituent power” capable of bringing back “the condition of
possibility of the modern idea of popular sovereignty.”14 In sum, the “Multitude” is the
pre-political form of “the people,” which we explore in this paper as civil society, whose
constituent power was obliterated for the purpose of what they argue was to safeguard
property rights. “In the course of the great bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th
centuries, the concept of the multitude is wiped out from the political and legal
vocabulary, and by means of this erasure the conception of the republic (res publica
rather than res communis) comes to be narrowly defined as an instrument to affirm and
safeguard property.”15 Scholar, Jim Tully goes even further and suggests that the modern
liberal constitutional form, which gave birth to the idea of “republic” and “representative
democracy,” was functional to the low cost and efficient continuation of the hegemonic
colonization of non European people. He suggests that the “paradox” of constituent
power is a result of two fundamental “antagonistic imperatives” in constitutionalism, one
which is that consent of “the people” must somehow be obtained (the idea of popular
sovereignty) and the other that “governmental power must be divided, constrained and
exercised through distinctive institutional forms.”16 One of such institutional forms,
assumed by modern liberal constitutionalism, and functional for the purposes of imperial
conquest, is private property. As Tully explains, these two imperatives pull in opposition
directions, and the tension has become more acute in modern constitutions, where the
12
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development of the constitutional framework has undergone a process of
institutionalization into highly complex and autonomous forms.17 Tully refers to this
institutional autonomy as “disembeddedness,”18 a defining feature of the modern
constitutional form, where the structure of law has an independent status from “the
activities of those who are subject to it” and thus has the power to “constitute” the field of
recognition and interaction of the people subject to it.”19 Thus, the “disembedded” and
“autonomous” quality of property as a institution, actually counterintuitively embeds it
within the modern constitutional structure itself. As a result, a pre-determined set of
property relations, which are not only defended by the substantive law but rather
underpin the entire constitutional form, restrain and constitute constituent power within
the limits of individual private property relations. This effectively makes the institution
of property invisible/unnoticeable from the point of view of the unified political entity of
“the people” and thus beyond contestation.
The private property relations assumed by liberal constitutionalism and the failure
of the idea of the public or “res publica” as representative democracy are resulting in the
inability of constitutional law to provide a shield against private interest, permitting the
take over of the public by predatory private actors, resulting not only to reinforce existing
property distributions, but effectuating massive transfers of public and common wealth
into private hands. Today, intensified by the global economic crisis and austerity
measures, governments of modern liberal constitutions under the “state of emergency”
act like the absolute sovereign monarchs of feudal times; transferring to the private sector
anything that it desires, as if it were a private owner to serve the interests and profits of
corporations. This complex transformation makes the very distinction between the public
and the private sector all but senseless, as visible in so many versions of revolving doors
and conflicts of interests, revealing the blatant collusion between state actors and the
global ruling élite that profit from privatizations. In this scenario, sometimes described as
neo-medievalism, state sovereignty is weak and constitutional law is reduced to shield the
people in front of a Leviathan that is uses the iron fist with the weak (the people) and the
velvet glove with the strong (corporate powers). Meanwhile, Leviathan is himself at the
mercy of transnational corporate power and its role is now essentially that of enclosing
the commons by a continuous process of privatization of its own sovereignty. In a
nutshell, while constitutional law can operate to defend the private sector against the
public one (due process of law, just compensation clause) it simply cannot operate the
public sector against the private one. Today, privatization is possible outside of any
constitutional limit or judicial review because states and governments are too weak to
impose a legal order over economic forces and private economic actors. Rather than
17
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ruling the economy, governments are ruled by economic power through a variety of
capture phenomena and by the operation of various ideological apparatuses, including
legal academia.20
If we accept the failure of representative government then what hope is there for
constituent power? What is the continuing relationship between constituents and the
constitution? What are the constitutionally designated ways in which constituents can
reassert popular sovereignty when representative government fails? Scholar Jim Tully
presents four theses explored by Loughlin and Walker about the ongoing constituent
relationship between the people and the constitution.
When people subject to a constitutional form see themselves as multitude (an as yet unorganized
and unrecognized potential agent) behind the whole constitutional-constituent formation and strive
to exercise all three constituent [political, labor, and security/police] power together, overthrow the
regime and bring into being a new kind of constitutional formation, which in turn must be subject
to ongoing constituent transformation (so the multitude remains sovereign over the constitutional
form to which it subjects itself).21

This thesis, called the “radical sovereignty” thesis, suggests that the pre-political
“multitude” can by an act of radical sovereignty, otherwise known as revolution,
overthrow a given constitutional form. Of course this can happen at the level of the whole
State territory, or it could take place in a much more limited physical space, such as an
occupied Theater, or firm, or a square, or a mountain Valley, that the multitude is
physically or politically capable to maintain beyond the reach of the State. The question
still remains, however when an act of the multitude is truly in the name of the multitude
and when is it an act of cutting the constitutional restraints of the Ulysses's bind and
heeding the sirens calls of mob rule. While there is clearly danger in treading beyond the
limits of the liberal constitutional form, given its deforming power vis a vis its
reinforcement of private property, and its weak protection of the public interest, it seems
clear that we must expand our notion of constituent power beyond the formalistic
“juridical containment” definition.22 Can we interpret the Multitude, “the pre-political”
form of the people, as civil society? Can civil society, autonomous and free from the
liberal constitutional form renew constituent power and the idea of popular sovereignty?
Can we only fight the private with the private? Today, we are witnessing, a new wave of
social movements of the commons playing a constituent role on both national and
transnational constitutional levels engages in an ongoing constituent transformation,
exercising constituent power in the absence of a constitution.
A. Social Movements as Constituent Power: Constituent Power without a Constitution
Social movements have a long history of affecting change, not only by exerting
pressure on politicians, but even on courts resulting at times on major shifts in
constitutional law.23 Think about the role for example the influence of civil rights
20
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activists in the United States on the Warren Court which produced Brown v. Board of
Education24 or the Friendly Settlement resulting in the Uwa indigenous people's case
against Occidental before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.25 These cases
highlight the important role civil society can play, not only in influencing courts, where
representative politics has failed in achieving social justice, but in the face of today's
weakening Leviathan to negotiate directly with multinationals themselves. Social
movements may offer a new “pouvoir constituent,” providing alternative channels for
achieving justice where states have failed. Many scholar are optimistic that a project for
“democratic constitutionalism,” as opposed to the imperial project of “constitutional
democracy,”26 is underway and points to “non-imperial forms of global networking;”
transnational social movements challenging from below the imperial power of
international organizations and multinationals imposed from above.
All over the world, citizens have worked to elect social democratic and workers' parties, only to
watch them plead impotence in the face of market forces and IMF dictates. In these conditions,
modern activists are not so naïve as to believe change will come from electoral politics. That's
why they are more interested in challenging the structures that make democracy toothless, like the
IMF's structural adjustment policies, the WTO's ability override national sovereignty, corrupt
campaign financing, and so on.27

As people increasingly lose faith in the power of the state as a forum for
transformative politics, they are increasingly turning to the “constituent power” of social
movements and tackling head on the very “structure” that makes democracy “toothless;”
the invisible rules and institutions which determine distributions of property and of
wealth. The role of social movements like the commons, while largely ignored by legal
scholars,28 we argue are playing two important functions in the context of the decline of
describes various “constitutional moments” taking place in four periods of American history often outside
of constitutional procedures and influenced by civil society).
24
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the nation state: 1) they are expanding the concept of “politics” enclosed by the liberal
constitutional form, which in turn is extending the concept of “constituent power” beyond
the liberal constitutional form of representative politics 2)they are filling a crucial
vacuum where representative politics has failed by offering alternative channels for
political engagement. Social movements are expanding our understanding of politics as
something more than a set of actions taken in formal political arenas. They are redefining
“what counts as political and who defines what is political.”29 Reuniting the idea of the
constitution with constituent power.
Scholar, Rajagopal identifies three waves of social movements: the first
characterized by their organization around the “nation” referring to the national liberation
projects of the third world which took place in the 50s and 60s; the second “identity”
wave referring to the civil rights, feminist, and gay rights movements which stretch from
the 60s into the 90s; and finally the third wave of “anti-globalization” movements which
erupted in the 90s as a reaction against capitalism, highlighting the struggle over global
resources.30 It is within this third wave that we locate the transnational movement of the
commons characterized as the struggle of local communities to reclaim access and
governance of resources from collusive state and market actors. Protest movements in the
form of local resistance against privatization are taking place throughout the world from
the Global South to the heart of the West.
As our communal spaces-town squares, streets, school, farms, plants- are displaced by the
ballooning market place, a spirit of resistance is taking hold around the world. People are
reclaiming bits of nature and of culture, and saying 'this is going to be public space.' American
students are kicking ads out of the classrooms. European environmentalists and ravers are
throwing parties at busy intersections. Landless Thai peasants are planting organic vegetables on
over irrigated golf courses. Bolivian workers are reversing the privatization of their water supply.
Protests are multiplying. 31

As Klein describes, these movements reclaiming the commons and fighting
against the negative effects of economic globalization are united through their opposition
to what has been identified as a common enemy: “Thanks to the sheer imperialist
ambition of the corporate project at this moment in history- the boundless drive for profit
(…) multinationals have grown so blindingly rich, so vast in their holdings, so global in
their reach, that they have created out coalition for us.”32 United against corporate
power, the commons movement are forming networks of activists together with the antiglobalization movement in the fight to protect common resources. The name, “antitraditional political for a that they join social movements in the first place. Ignored and excluded from the
traditional political for a it is no surprise that they are also largely ignored by legal scholarship.).
29
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globalization,” in many ways has always been a misnomer, as what the movement fights
is not globalization, but rather like the commons movements, corporations and
capitalism, working to ensure that “it is those who live on the land who benefit from its
development.”33 Commons social movements are not only claiming that the “personal is
political,” to borrow the slogan made popular by the feminist wave of social movements,
by demanding that property relations governed by private law are exposed to contestation
in the political sphere through the political process, but (primarily in the Global South)
they are also making the “political personal” by demanding through the political process
that the public sphere respect existing communal forms of property relations, acting as a
shield against corporate and state control.34 Social movements of local communities
reclaiming their autonomy through collective ownership over common resources, not
only challenges the logic of private property assumed by liberal constitutionalism but also
threatens the role of the state. “As one Indian minister said upon being confronted with a
local dam-building effort by farmers in the Krishna River valley using local, small-scale
technology: “If peasants build dams, then what will the state have left to do?”35
Rajagopal goes on to cite numerous examples of communities in India engaged in
self rule outside of the state of collective lands and resources from the Panchayat raj
amendments to the triban Gram Sabhas.36 These actions not only challenge the state but
its concept of development compelling recognition of alternative forms of property.
Social movements, however are not necessarily pursuing autonomy with the state as its
target, but rather they seek autonomy from the logic of private property which underpins
its liberal constitutional form. In fact in many cases, the state and traditional public
politics are important arenas and sources of support for social movements. “Their attitude
is often strategic, contingent and opportunistic towards institutions of the state-they
constrain or work with whichever institution happens to show more support for their
interests at any given time.”37 It is this “strategic, contingent and opportunistic” attitude
of social movements which reinforces their autonomy and in turn their “constituent”
potential. It is this very autonomy from the constitutional form, which gives social
movements their raw political potential. This autonomy also provides the freedom for
social movements to engage in “politics” utilizing non traditional methods and non
traditional forums: in the form of protests, occupations, transnational networks, and
alternative institutions of governance.
These alternative forums for “doing politics”
outside the state have in many cases proved more effective for regulating predatory
private actors than through state regulation. Increasingly, the state is being sidelined as
local communities are directly negotiating with multinationals both on local and national
levels, strategically using both private and public tools and forums, as will be explored in
the Italian case of the beni comuni. Many scholars argue that “one of the key political
33
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developments of recent times has been the direct engagement between social movements
operating in transnational mode and the major players in the global economy.” Gavin
Anderson makes a very strong case for the success of this direct engagement through the
example of the conflict between the Uwa community in Columbia and Occidental over
amazonian oil resources. In this case the Uwa indigenous people were able to bypass the
corrupted state and national politics to fight Occidental by building a transnational
campaign which ended in a Friendly Settlement before the Inter American Commission
of Human Rights, successfully terminating Occidental's drilling rights in the Uwa's
land.38 The resources wars have taken a transnational and subaltern turn: rather than a
future of states fighting one another for over control of crucial resources like water and
energy, in the face of a weakening leviathan overtaken by powerful corporate actors, it is
the multitude of civil society actors and not the state that is capable of battle corporate
“pirates” in the private channels of free markets, beyond the regulation of the nationstate. In this way social movements, unbound by the limits of the state and its
constitutional form, offer alternative political strategies and forums in the vacuum created
by a weakening Leviathan, revitalizing constituent power without a textual constitution.
In order to give a thick practical substance to these theoretical premises, we will
now analyze the kind of constituent role played by the Italian beni comuni through a
“participant observation” by Ugo Mattei, a key figure in the movement. The beni comuni
movement, as the constituent struggle for the commons is a good example of a
constituent struggle between social movements, the state, and corporate forces. The beni
comuni movement invoked both indirectly and directly constitutional protections of the
public and commons described below, and these actions can be viewed as efforts to
restore the democratic constitutional fabric, especially in light of the many illegal
changes made to the constitution simultaneously by neoliberal oppositional forces. Many
of the actions pointed directly to constitutional text available in a number of highly
advanced and mostly unimplemented provisions of the 1948 Constitution, as described
above, most fundamentally in Article 3 and Article 42, however while the movement
upholds the spirit of the constitution, and thus being outside and autonomous the beni
comuni movement is exposing the contradictions of the state-private property dualism,
which has colonized the modern constitutional imagination.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL & CONSTITUENT ROLE OF THE ITALIAN BENI
COMUNI: A PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION39
This section describes the referendum campaign and formation of the beni comuni
as a social movement in the Italian national context, as well the oppositional neoliberal
forces, which organized against it. A diverse array of actors (scholars, lawyers, activists
and politicians) produced the complex scenario of struggle for the commons using both
legal and political tools to advance a vision that the referendum proved as potentially
hegemonic in the country despite continuous attempts, rooted in an emergency strategy,
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by the official organs of the State to maintain and constitutionally restructure the neoliberal order. The beni comuni movement utilized a strategy, which was fully aware of
the complex and highly pluralist nature of the law in the contemporary scenario, in many
instances successfully reclaiming the commons from neoliberal privatization. These
legal and political actions of the beni comuni movement have reinvigorated the
constitutional debate in two ways. First, by bringing the “economic constitution” within
the Italian Constitution to life, thereby reinserting popular consciousness of what ought to
be the space for the “public” and the constituent role of the people back into
constitutional debate. Second, by preventing, through successful constitutional challenge,
the claim by the large neoliberal majority currently sitting in Parliament of its own power
to ignore the referendum result thereby establishing a higher constitutional value of the
will directly expressed by the people over that stemming from Parliament. Thanks to the
beni comuni movement direct democracy has renewed relevance in the Italy.
A. Background of the Italian “Economic Constitution” & Constituent Role of the Beni
Comuni
In Italy, the constituent claim of the commons movement is rooted in the
constitution's purpose of defending the people against abuses of power. The idea behind
the commons constitutional claim is that the most fundamental constitutional reform that
one could promote in Italy today is the implementation of the current constitution,
especially Art. 3 and 42, rather than the drafting of new provisions (which would be
illegitimate given the current lack of parliamentary representativeness today in Italy).
Article 3 goes beyond the bourgeois liberal model by making it a “duty” of the Republic
to remove the social and economic obstacles that de facto make it impossible for
everybody to participate in the political life of the country.40 Article 42, while
considering private and public property on the same level (“property is public or private”)
requires the law to protect private property only as far as it is “accessible to everybody”
and serves a “social function.”41 Similar “social” language is shared by many
constitutions of the twentieth century42 but the political effort to implement this vision
(through a gradual process of limitation of social inequality) has been discontinued after
the so called Reagan-Thatcher revolution. Here, the background of the relevant
economic provisions of the Italian Constitution, which the commons brought to life are
40
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presented.
The Italian Constitution of 1948, the product of a constituent process in which for
the first time also women could participate, is usually described as a great compromise
between three cultural components represented by the political parties that freed the
country from Nazi occupation and fascist rule: the liberals, the socialists\communists and
the popular Catholics.43 In fact, the Yalta agreements placed Italy firmly within the
capitalist block so that the very powerful Communist party, always functional in
maintaining a capitalist status quo, was to be formally “compensated for a missed
revolution with a promised one,” to use the sarcastic description of Piero Calamandrei, a
liberal champion, a founding father and a famous scholar of civil procedure, later to
become the first Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court.44 More recent scholarship has
argued that the Italian Constitutional text, rather than being a coherent compromise of
merits was a clever move to table the discussion of the most heated issues, by postponing
them to future political struggles.45 The technical tools deployed to implement this truce
were: the broad delegation of authority to the formal (ordinary) law to define the limits of
economic activity (so called “riserva di legge”), and trade union negotiations, supported
by the constitutional right of strike, which were seen as a wait and see strategy functional
to the interests of all the political parties represented in the Assembly. As a consequence,
while the Constitution emphatically sides with labor in its struggle against capital, (in
particular Art. 1), the actual text of what is usually known as the “economic constitution”
is much more ambiguous and clearly divided in zones of cultural and political influence.
In particular Art. 41, the brain-child of the liberals mostly influenced by the
conservative economist Luigi Einaudi, later to become the first Italian President of the
Republic, is the fundamental guarantee of free enterprise, which can only be limited by
the law in the interest of human health, safety and dignity.46 Art 42 contains a clear
protection of private property, which includes the traditional just compensation clause,
only limited by the notion of the “social function of private property” borrowed from the
European debate of the early twentieth century and previously rejected in the drafting of
the civil code. This article, especially dear to the social Catholics (Dossetti), avoided
taking a position by referring to ordinary law the “property question” in the
Constitutional Assembly.47 Article 4348 gives constitutional recognition to the major role
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that factory councils in the Northern industrial triangle (Turin, Milan, Genova) had
played in the liberation struggle and by reserving certain strategic assets to “communities
of workers and users” can be seen as the “promised revolution” (with just compensation
guarantee!) that the cynical leader of the Communist party, Palmiro Togliatti could use to
pacify his constituency so that it respected Stalin’s desires at Yalta. Significantly this
Article, the constitutional basis of any nationalization policy, was practically dormant
through the life of the 1948 Constitution and only very recently came to new life being
deployed as a Constitutional base for action by both the occupation movement generated
by the referendum on the commons and the attempts to grant direct participation of the
people in the administration of the utilities system that is taking place in Naples. 49
Finally, Article 9 strictly connected to property law has also remained dormant for many
years but is now playing a very significant role in the critique of the neo-liberal logic.
This article gives protection to cultural property and the “landscape” a notion
incrementally interpreted as “the environment,” and it offers a powerful constitutional
argument for a critique of the logic of exploitation of nature that so much characterizes
the current order. For its introduction in the Italian Constitution credit is due to Concetto
Marchesi, a leading classicist and Communist representative in the Constitutional
convention.
Within the same logic of tabling the issues, as no party knew who would
eventually be in minority, the Italian Constitutional system rejected any “winner takes
all” logic. The very same power was vested in the two Chambers, the Prime Minister was
seen as a “primus inter pares”, the President of the Republic was given a mostly formal
“super partes” role of representation (something similar to that of the President in
Germany or to the Monarchy in Great Britain or Spain), and the “core” of the democratic
struggle was intended to be between the political parties, where citizens could participate
in the democratic life of the country (Art. 49),50 Parties were formally kept as “private
organizations,” their leaders being endorsed with shining credibility and a large level of
deserved prestige, due to the role they were able to play in clandestine organizations and
later administrative authorities in the progressively liberated areas of the country. The
idea was that the more representative democracy is trusted, the less direct citizen’s
participatory democracy is needed. Consequently, in the Italian constitutional scheme
direct democracy was maintained in a very minor form. The Referendum takes only two
forms. The abrogation referendum of Article 7551 of the Constitution, which can be
requested by half a million voters that wish to abolish a formal statute not connected with
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taxation, budget, amnesty, pardon or ratification of an international treaty. Also a
confirmation referendum can be requested by the same number of citizens if a
Constitutional changed is introduced by Parliament. This possibility is not available if the
change is passed in both Chambers with a 2\3 majority. While the confirmation
referendum has no quorum, the abrogation referendum requires a turnout of half the
electorate to validly abolish a law.
In the last two decade “economic constitution” described above, primarily Art. 3
and 42 was transformed by privatization and the development of the idea of the
“regulatory state” was replaced by that of “entrepreneur state,” which intellectually
justified the dismantling of the welfare system in the name of competition and
efficiency.52 The formal constitution was transformed in 2001 to decentralize the system
enlarging the power of the regions but the fundamental idea of the social state was never
openly challenged until the current constituent phase. The targets of the constituent attack
to the text of the 1948 constitution began with the last shot of the Berlusconi Government
that in the process of drafting the “Ferragosto Decree” blamed the Italian crisis on Art. 41
of the Constitution (as we remember the brain-child of conservative liberals such as
Einaudi and De Nicola) which states that free enterprise “cannot be carried on in contrast
with social utility or in a way that damages human security, dignity and freedom” and
that reserves to the law (again technique of tabling the issues) “to determine the program
and the appropriate controls so that public and private economic activity can be aimed
and coordinated to reach social purposes.” The read of the Berlusconi Government,
carried on in full continuity by Monti, was that the ex ante model of administrative
control, typical of the civil law tradition, was to be replaced by a system of ex post facto
redress on the tort law model typical of the US. Art. 1 of the Ferragosto decree
emphatically stated that, within the necessary time to change Art. 41 Constitution, all
what is not expressly prohibited to the enterprise is now legal. This inedited style of
constitutional reform by decree is itself the object of a pending constitutional challenge.
The discussion on the formal reform of the economic Constitution was thus
officially inaugurated in a context in which the very idea of reform had changed from its
original meaning. Previously seen as an incremental application of Art. 3 of the
Constitution in order to reach a more egalitarian society, reform now means, in the neoliberal context, deregulation and increased “flexibility” of the legal system in order to
maximize the spaces of free economic enterprise. While proposals to reform Art. 41 of
the Constitution are still making their way through Parliament, the first formal victim of
the new wave of constituent strategy (dubbed structural reform) inaugurated by the Monti
Government is Art. 81 of the Constitution. This article has been rewritten with an
overwhelming Parliamentary majority (more than 2\3) in two separate reads of both
Chambers, to include the balanced budget provision arguably “required” the Italians by
the Troika (EU Commission, BCE, IMF). The inclusion of a balance budget provision,
coupled with the ratification of the so called “fiscal compact” agreement will make it
practically impossible to revamp the public sector and to effectively carry on the reform
plan of art. 3. The new reform ideology has taken over the Constitution of 1948
introducing, within its very text, a principle that defeats all its promises. What one must
add is that the current Parliament enjoys a popularity rate of less than 10%, and that by
voting with this overwhelming majority it has made it impossible for the people to call
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the confirmative referendum (Art. 138). The coalition defeated in the water referendum
didn’t want to risk the polls again! Interestingly this very significant Constitutional
reform, one of the handfuls of textual changes since 1948, has been carried out in the
complete absence of debate and even when the reform was written into law, the media
did not even report the event. Today many usually informed citizens still do not know
that the change occurred.
The pressure exerted by the “troika” of the European Union played a large role in
installing the technical “puppet” government capable of implementing austerity measures
in the absence of public support. The Monti Government, short from being a technical
executive, shows a very marked pro-business attitude. Among its early successes there
was a pension system reform, passed without consultation with the trade unions, a reform
of the labor market, dismantling most of the guarantees that the worker’s movement had
obtained in the nineteenth seventies, and a reform of professional services aimed at
liberalization. His attention on the public transportation system has also been sustained
with an attempted liberalization of the Taxi cab industry. The Government has moreover
linked the municipalities to a strict balanced budget requirement that made it necessary to
sell a variety of assets; it has reformed the local taxation system by introducing a new tax
on immovable property accompanied by a revaluation of the cadastral value. The
privatization of public property, including a large number of rural areas belonging to the
State. In particular Art. 4 made it even less likely to maintain public services in public
hands, while Art. 18 declared the area around the works of the TAV train in Valsusa a
“site of strategic interest” defined by a red zone broadly protected by criminal law. In
sum, through deploying the “state of emergency,” the Monti government has been able to
implement a “shock doctrine,” facilitating the expansion of capital and profits for the
private sector.
Significant part of this policy, in particular the compulsory privatizations of public
services, have been deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in its already
mentioned landmark decisions (n 199 and 200) of July 17 2012. The Court seized by a
local government (Regione Puglia) represented by lawyers of the beni comuni movement
(including one of these writers) decided that the decision directly taken by the people in a
referendum being an exercise of direct democracy must be respected by representatives
sitting in Parliament for a reasonable amount of time. Thus the doctrine of “succession of
the law in time”, that would apply should a statute had equal value to a referendum does
not apply. Direct democracy, one of the strongest tools of constitutional power available
to the people, thus enjoys in Italy a surplus of constitutional force compared to ordinary
legislation.
B. The Italian Water Referendum & the beni comuni (Common Goods) as a National
Social Movement
The Referendum of June 13, 2011 was the climax moment of a long struggle to
limit the apparently irresistible process of neo-liberal commodification and
privatization.53 This referendum is often referred to as the “water” referendum because
much of the political momentum leading to its success was linked to the global struggle
against water privatization, whose global visibility was granted by the Cochabamba war
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on water of 2000. Indeed the very simple platform, “water as a common,”mobilized tens
of thousands of activists from its proposal in December 2010 to its success in June 2011
when more that 27 million Italians went to the ballot.54 Thanks to the high turnout and
95% majority, it was the first time in Italian history where an absolute majority of the
voters answered “yes” to a proposed statutory abolition. In order to understand the
success of the Referendum we need to consider two important points: First that water was
not the only issue on which the referendum was called and second, that the referendum
was only one tool of a larger effort to challenge the neo-liberal logic of privatization that
in Italy has occupied most of the first decade of the new millennium.
In June 2011, the Italians were called upon to vote on four questions, only one of
which was technically devoted to water. The first referendum was aimed at stopping a
compulsory program of privatization of all of public services and involved, public
transportation, garbage collection and other public services provided by local
governments such as nursery schools.55 The second referendum, the only specifically
devoted to water, was aimed to abolish a legal provision that guaranteed the
“remuneration of the invested capital” as part of the final cost to the user of the water
supply system. This referendum aimed to preclude the profit motive from the water
service, thus canceling the incentives to private companies to deal with water. The third
referendum, presented by a committee different from the “water as a common,” was
aimed at abolishing the law that re-established an Italian nuclear program,56 and
complemented the alternative vision of society that the commons movement was
proposing in Italy. The fourth referendum, promoted by an opposition party IDV, was
aimed at abolishing laws providing a judicial shield to Prime Minister Berlusconi and
was all but legally empty, though very meaningful from the political point of view.
Interestingly, while all the questions were overwhelmingly approved by the voters with
majorities of more than 95%, the most voted question was the question specifically
devoted to abolishing profit on water.
After a phase of negotiation with the water movement and a major organizational
effort to put together a broad coalition of civil society organizations (which included
trade unions, environmental and consumers groups, but that purposefully excluded direct
political parties participation), the questions were finally deposited at the Court of
Cassation in Rome and the signature collection officially started on April 22, 2010,
permitting the Referendum to take place in the spring of 2011 in a timely way to stop the
compulsory privatization of water designed by the Ronchi Decree. According to Italian
constitutional law, the half million signatures were duly collected in person and officially
certified one by one by a notary or another public official of the municipality and were
collected within three months from the date of the referendum and placed on the proper
form released by the Court of Cassation. The collection process proved to be an
incredible sign of vitality of the commons movement, which mobilized tenths of
thousands of volunteers, collecting nationwide signatures in the most remote corners of
the country. People, usually skeptical of political collections of signatures actually lined
up, sometimes for hours, to sign and by mid July 2010 more that 1.4 million certified
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signatures were transported in huge boxes in front of a crowd of media and reporters to
the Court of Cassation.
1. Neoliberal Oppositional Powers & Battle at the Constitutional Level
The strategy of the bi-partisan neoliberal coalition opposing the Referendum
clearly emerged from the very beginning. The referendum was to be ignored by the
media. Berlusconi himself, well known for his control over official newspapers and
national TV Channels, and the Democratic Party in power in many regions and
municipalities, was extremely hostile to this effort of direct democracy, which could
endanger its own possibility to profit off of planned privatizations. This explains the quite
impressive silencing strategy, which was clearly aimed at making the Referendum fail for
lack of the sufficient turnout at the polls. On the merits, the theory of our opponents was
that the liberalization of the local public services was a requirement of European law so
that the Constitutional Court could not possibly admit the Referendum. As mentioned,
Referendum cannot abolish a law that is mandated by International law which is
technically the nature of European legislation. Nevertheless on January 12, 2011 the
Constitutional Court gave a genuine lesson of Constitutional and European law by
admitting four of the six questions presented, including two out of three of those
presented by the Water coalition. It was to the large satisfaction of the lawyers involved
in the argument (including one of these authors), because the Court clearly said that
European Law does not mandate liberalization nor privatization of public services and
that it is up to the member states to decide whether they prefer to use the private sector
(only in this case they are bound by European law contrasting State subsidies) or whether
they prefer to take direct responsibility of public services. According to the Court, the
Decreto Ronchi was a discretionary act of the Italian State, and as such could be
abolished should a referendum be successful in doing so. The Court also discussed, as
mandated by its own case law, the issue of the legal vacuum that might follow a
referendum because, should it happen after the abolition of the law, the referendum could
also not be admitted. The Court held that there would be no vacuum in all the admitted
questions because European law could directly be applied to fill up the vacuum leaving to
each local municipality the choice of what to do with its own public services.
Once the obstacle of admission was passed, the real political difficulties started
because the voters were largely ignorant of the fact that a Referendum had been called.
With no help from the media, the commons activists had to engage in a very long, old
style, door to door campaign because the Internet and the social media, although assisted
a lot especially among youth, in Italy are still very short from reaching the majority of the
population. To make the issue even more difficult was the fact that Italians were already
called to a double set of administrative elections in the month of May, and the
government refused to have the Referendum at the same time. Rather, it opted
strategically for the last possible date, June 12-13: when schools were already closed,
many people on vacation, and students still away from home to take university exams.
The legal challenge in Court against the decision of having an independent date for the
referendum (costing Italian taxpayers an estimated 300 million Euros in extra
organizational costs) was defeated because both the administrative and constitutional
jurisdictions held that the executive enjoyed a discretionary power on this matter. This
almost desperate situation was subverted by the nuclear accident of Fukushima which

produced a panic reaction of the Government that attempted to cancel by decree the
nuclear referendum, fearful that a majority of the people would show up to the poll as it
had happened already in a previous one of 1986 in the aftermath of Chernobyl. This
attempt produced much stir on the media, because of the Government’s declaration that it
was acting to avoid an emotional and irrational vote. This time the legal reaction was
sustained by the Court of Cassation (that confirmed the date of the referendum) and the
accident only produced a final round of media visibility to the whole referendum
campaign. In the last few weeks, when it became clear that the victory was not beyond
our reach the Democratic Party jumped on our train and the largest newspaper La
Repubblica (very close to this party) also shifted gear. Moreover, in the administrative
elections of Naples, Milan and Cagliari three absolute outsiders, enjoying the support of
the commons movement, won against establishment bi-partisan neo-liberal candidates.
Consequently, this exciting phase of Italian political life after the overwhelming
referendum victory became known as the Italian Spring, as being credited for creating the
conditions for the fall of the Berlusconi Government.
The Italians had voted to invert direction away from neo-liberal ideology by
participating in massive numbers (more than 55 % to a referendum with little media
covereage) to re-establish responsibility for a renewed public sector and to defend the
commons from both privatization (Questions 1 and 2) and mega-projects of development
(Question 3). This vote has certified a large separation between the Parliament and the
people. In fact, the sitting Italian Parliament was already suffering a democratic deficit.
Elected in 2008 with an electoral law (significantly nicknamed “porcellum” the pig’s
law) that curtailed the possibility of the people it to choose their representatives, it is
resented as composed by MPs chosen by the political parties secretariats rather than by
the people. Practically every one of its members either was against the referendum or
strategically decided in its favor at the very last minute and certainly was not ready to
oppose neoliberalism. Thus a constitutional crisis was open. The official reaction to the
“Italian spring” followed a path that directly opposed the vision articulated by the
commons movement. In the summer of 2011 a strong attack by the so called “financial
markets” targeted Italy. On the first days of August, a “secret” letter signed by the sitting
and the designed Governors of the European Central Bank was delivered to Silvio
Berlusconi requiring urgent action by decree to reduce the Italian public debt. This letter
required a strong liberalization policy not only of the public services but also of the labor
market. A few days later, on August 14 2011, the day in which most Italian are in
vacation, the Berlusconi Government weakened by internal infighting and by a wave of
sexual and corruption scandals enacted a Decree aimed at introducing urgent measures to
“calm” the international speculation which included a provision, Art. 4 of the “Ferragosto
Decree” entirely reproduced the text of Art. 13 bis of the Ronchi Decree. By so doing the
Government re-proposed a roadmap for obligatory liberalization and eventual
privatization of the public services maintaining water as an exception. An envelope
containing almost ten thousands signatures collected in a few days via internet under an
appeal to the President, produced by three of the legal scholars that had prepared the
Referendum (Lucarelli, Mattei and Nivarra), arguing that to write the Decree into law
would be unconstitutional. The request was ignored and the Ferragosto Decree, was
urgently signed into law only to be declared unconstitutional less than a year later by the
already mentioned decisions 199 and 200 of the Constitutional Court for its contradiction

of the Referendum result which, by reproducing an obligation to sell, abridged the
prerogative of the local governments (Regions). Rather than paying attention to the will
of the people President Napolitano was keen on following the desires of the International
business community and with practically no consultations decided the name of the next
Italian Prime Minister, installing yet another “technical government.” Despite the
respectful obedience to the European diktat of the Decree of Ferragosto, Berlusconi could
not keep a majority and was forced to resign in favor of newly appointed Life Senator the
former European Commissioner to the Internal Market, neo-liberal economist and
President of the conservative Bocconi University in Milano. This transition shamelessly
negotiated in the shadow of the need to please the so called Troika and the international
markets, occurred in a context of relentless propaganda where the declared “emergency”
was to avoid “ending like Greece.”
2.Beni Comuni as a National Social Movement
In order to explain the unexpected success (no referendum reached a quorum in
the last 16 years) of the campaign, one must consider that a national network of local
water committees (active in different part of the country since 2001) was in place since
2006, and a systematic scholarly effort to re-think and criticize the legal basis, which was
facilitating easy privatization in Italy, was in place since 2005 and undoubtedly these two
primary forces contributed to the overall success of the referendum.57 The commons idea,
in the aftermath of the Referendum, was way beyond the single issue movement of water.
In Italy the commons has emerged today as the recognized symbol of a different vision:
theoretically articulated in a Manifesto (published in September 201158), which generated
a large political and legal literature, many contextual struggles and, most recently even
the birth of a new political entity, Alleanza Lavoro Beni Comuni Ambiente (ALBA).59
The movement was built by a combination of scholars, lawyers, and activists claiming
not only water but nature, culture, labor, and education as a commons. The origins of this
movement in its different constituent dimensions is explored below.
a. Scholars
The effort of scholars, particular the research carried out at the Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei, the most prestigious scholarly institution of the country, was
critical in building the beni comuni movement. The study carried out at the Lincei was
motivated by the observation that Italy between 1992 and 2000 was the first country in
the world from the point of view of privatized assets (roughly 140 billion Euros of value
),which makes it the second worldwide (after Great Britain) in the value of privatizations
between 1979 and 2008.60 In 2007, under the Prodi Government, the scholarly effort at
the Lincei generated the establishment by decree of a special commission of the Ministry
of Justice. Its task was to propose a reform of the provision on public property contained
in the Italian Civil Code, in order to establish some principles governing the possibility
and the limits of the privatization of public assets. At the fall of the Prodi Government,

57

•
Rodotà Commission Bill, Delegated Legislation to Reform the Civil Code Articles
Concerning Public Property, Atto Senato n. 2031, XVI Legislatura
58
UGO MATTEI, BENI COMUNI: UN MANIFESTO (IXth ed 2012)
59
www.soggettopoliticonuovo.it
60
See MATTEI, REVIGLIO, RODOTA, supra note 53.

the now famous Rodotà Commission61 produced its reform proposal, which contained the
first technical definition of the commons, as a legal category and form of property
different from both private and public ownership, deserving special protection at the
constitutional level. This proposal, abandoned by the second Berlusconi Government
(which took office in April 2008) was resurrected by a bipartisan bill presented by the
Piedmont Region in November 2009 but was never discussed by the Senate.62 In the
definition of the Rodotà Commission, the commons are “goods that provide utilities
essential to the satisfaction of fundamental rights of the person” and access to such goods
remains no matter if the formal title of ownership is public or private and in all cases
must be protected also in the “interest of future generations.”63 Water was included as the
first item in the open list of the commons suggested by the Rodotà Commision. While
this political and scholarly effort, justified by a sense of responsibility for future
generations, was in place (and here the influence of the Constitutional experience of
Bolivia and Ecuador was clear), the very same day (November 26, 2009) in which the
Rodotà text was presented in the Senate by the Piedmont Region, the lower chamber
passed with a confidence vote and no parliamentary discussion, the so called “Decreto
Ronchi”, which introduced a duty for local governments to follow a compulsory scheme
of privatization of all local services aimed at transferring control to the private sector.64
According to article 113 bis of the Decree, by December 31, 2011 all local services
controlled by the public sector, including the water supply system, were to be placed on
the market by a public auction. Art. 1 of the Decree declared that such release of public
control was mandated by European law.65 This blatant display of corruption, generated a
mode of indignation and within a few days six law professors, four of which already
members of the Rodotà commission (Professors Mattei, Lucarelli, Nivarra, Rodotà,
Azzariti and Ferrara), drafted three of the referendum questions, created a referendum
committee, and posted66 a document on the web calling for the beginning of a referendum
procedure, two of the questions presented which were eventually admitted by the
Constitutional Court to be put on the ballot.
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b. Activists Forum Acqua beni comuni
The efforts of the water network (Forum Italiano per I movimento dell’ acqua) in
2009 produced the Citizen’s Initiative Bill for a Water reform statute,67 which collected
more than 400.000 signatures, only 50.000 of which are necessary for such initiatives.
The popular Water bill proposed, however, was never discussed in Parliament. The
Forum was crucial in organizing an impressive coalition of trade unions, consumers
movements, activist’s groups and a few left-wing political parties (not represented in
Parliament), which carried on the basic coordination effort for the collection of the
signatures, the fundraising and the production of the materials necessary for the
campaign.
c. “Culture as a Commons” Theater Occupations
On June 14, 2011 the day after the Referendum, a group of precarious workers of
the cultural industry: actors, technicians, musicians and independent producers, occupied
the Valle Theater in Rome. Their motto was “Like water and like air. Let’s recapture
culture.” The Valle Theater, one of the oldest and most prestigious theaters in Europe,
was in the process of being relinquished by the Minister of Culture, transferred to the
Rome Municipality run by a former Fascist major, in order to be placed on the market for
privatization. The occupation was masterminded as a short demonstrative event aimed at
rising public attention of a category of workers that were suffering under the established
neo-liberal policy of cuts on public spending for culture. The occupants invited this
author, Mattei, as a protagonist of the water campaign, to address the permanent
assembly and after a lecture on “culture as a commons,” a decision was taken to make the
occupation permanent and steps were taken develop a long term legal and political plan
of a constituent nature. What is occurring at the Valle Theater, short from being an action
limited to the world of the arts, is an ambitious political plan to hybridize culture, politics,
and economics to transform the Valle into the hub of a large bottom-up occupation
network movement of the commons aimed at real constituent power. The long term plan
is to develop an “independent participant foundation”68 endowed with a set of bylaws
capable to offer an example of a legal setting working as a constitution of the commons
based on a direct application of Art. 43 Constitution.69 Today, the model of the Valle as a
commons and the method of occupation is being put in action not only in Rome but also
in Venice (Teatro Marinoni), Catania (Teatro Coppola), Naples (Asilo della creatività),
Palermo (Teatro Garibaldi) and Milan where a 31 story building was occupied on May 5,
2012 in order to transform it into a “cultural common” before being evacuated by a very
controversial police reaction.70 This bottom up constituent effort is rooted in the people's
right of resistance and links together all the apparently distant struggles against the
neoliberal politics carried on by those suffer most under its destructive policy.
d. “Nature, labor, and education as a commons”
In the aftermath of the Referendum, in the Valle di Susa near Turin, the NO TAV
67

Id. supra at note 59.
http://www.teatrovalleoccupato.it/
69
A “Community of workers and users” is now running the Theater which is thriving in the heart of
Rome. Such a “community” mentioned in Art. 43 Constitution is neither a public nor a private institution
but rather, an experience of revolutionary commoning, such as that of workers in Nazi occupied Italy.
70
La Repubblica, “Macao, addio alla Torre Galfa occupato un palazzo a
Brera”:http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2012/05/19/news/macao_addio_alla_torre_galfa_occupato_un_p
alazzo_a_brera-35475294/
68

movement, which in the last 20 years had resisted a mega development project of a new
56 kilometers tunnel through the Alps, occupied an area close to the area where the first
perforations were supposed to take place. The movement has declared the area a “Libera
Repubblica della Maddalena,” and has experienced for more than a month a community
economy based on gift and cooperation. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to
describe this long and still ongoing saga, however suffice it to say that the Susa Valley
population is still systematically accused (by a media system in a blatant conflict of
interest) as a violent and illegal NIMBY (not in my backyard) approach, which has been
attacked by the police with violent means and incarceration of activists. There again, in a
very large assembly, with this writer as a representative of the water movement, the idea
that that the NO TAV was a commons movement, opposing in the general interest, the
same logic of economic and political concentration of the Nuclear industry. The
Maddalena was violently evacuated by the police on the morning of June 26, 2011 but the
motto “NO TAV beni comuni” a radical reconfiguration of the NIMBY idea from the
individual “not in my yard” to our collective “nature is a common.” The theory of the
commons has connected the NO TAV with the Valle Theater, water, the no nukes and the
many other experiences of anti neo-liberal resistance. The motto was carried in Turin at
the head of a demonstration of more than 20,000 participants that for the first time
brought the NO TAV outside of the closed perimeter of the Susa Valley. Instrumental to
the success of this march was the FIOM trade union, just expelled from the FIAT after a
dramatic blackmail referendum in January 13 2011, that on October 16 2010, right in the
middle of the water campaign, had marched in Rome in a gigantic demonstration lead by
the motto “Il Lavoro é un beni comuni.” Furthermore, on December 15, 2011, while the
Berlusconi government was beginning to lose its majority in Parliament because of
infighting in the post-fascist part of its coalition, a massive student demonstration against
the University Reform bill took place in Rome and was stopped by the police resulting in
many arrests of students. Here again the motto of the protest , which involved many
student unions active in the Referendum campaign was “L’Università é un beni comuni”
(University is a common good.)
e. Assessor of the Commons
In Naples a newly elected mayor, elected as a complete outsider just weeks before
the referendum victory thanks to the strong endorsement of environmental and social
activists, in the middle of an embarrassing crisis of garbage accumulation through the
city, appointed one of the drafters of the water referendum (Alberto Lucarelli) to a newly
established post, that of “Assessor to the commons” (Assessore ai beni comuni). This key
political role is aimed at experimenting with new forms of local participatory democracy
based on Art. 43 of the Constitution, and to create a new participant institutional system
of governance for the local utilities corporation in what is the third largest Italian city.
The municipality of Naples has thus become a hub for commons activism, having
launched a variety of campaigns, including a campaign for a “European Charter of the
Commons”, to be proposed as a citizen’s initiative to the European Commission
according to art. 11, of the Lisbon Treaty. A proposed draft of the Charter, drafted by a
high level academic conference in December 2011 at the International University College
of Turin, and presented at an International Conference at the Valle Theater in Rome in
February 2012, is now in the process of being discussed Europe-wide through partners at

European Alternatives71 (meetings have been organized in a number of European
capitals: London, Rome, Paris, Zagreb, Sophia) to elaborate the best strategy to make this
action effective.
In sum, the beni comuni movement engaged as constituents in a constitutional
process from the bottom up: invoking legal tools at local, national and even supernational levels, and carrying out a strategy both through private law and the public law
tools wherever possible. For example, the occupation of the Valle Theater attempted to
translate its radically democratic practice into such a private law tool as a foundation, a
counter hegemonic use of the law in order to oppose a language and practice of legality
based on private autonomy to the accusation of carrying on illegal practices. Other
struggles, such as the water one, or the NO TAV are using a variety of legal tools:
including resort to Courts of law, ordinary, administrative and even constitutional, to
vindicate respect of the referendum meaning and to protect the rights of the people
against the anti-democratic use of public authority. In other places such as Naples the
very structure of local government authority has been modified in order to relinquish
power to the people for direct or at least participatory governance of the commons.
Finally, the availability of such tools of public participation that have been provided very
recently by European law, such as the European Citizens Initiative are also on the radarscreen of the activists to explore their availability and functionality to carry on their
struggles. Most significant however, was the contribution of beni comuni movement in
modifying the constitution in action by giving full force and effective application to the
previously unapplied provisions of the 1948 Constitutional text, (especially Art. 43)
bringing life to the “economic constitution” to defend the public and common against the
private sector.
The commons movement has quite systematically used the strategy of physical
occupation for reclaiming and actually managing commons. Such a strategy directly
challenges existing constitutionally reinforced private property relations. From the point
of view of property law, these actions would be deemed “illegal,”however the commons
movement refuses the idea of being engaged in an “illegal” practice. Rather, the claim is
that occupations are aimed at opening up enclosed common spaces, the access to which is
constitutionally guaranteed, and are therefore to be considered legitimate exercises of
people’s constituent power. These actions are legitimate as long as they genuine efforts to
“open up” and to grant direct access to property (both private and public) to implement
its “social function” and to defend the public interest from the abusive use of the right to
exclude. It is argued that these occupations are aimed at “opening up” public and private
spaces by a formally “illegal” action to recover peoples possession of under-utilized or
corruptly utilized spaces functioning as a sort of peoples “drittwirkung,” (horizontal
application of Constitutional law in private law matters) whose legitimacy is determined
by the actual capacity to resist an illegal rule of law by counter-hegmonically turning the
law against itself and subverting the very meaning of legality. This however still begs the
question, when is occupation, which is the very physical act of resisting existing property
relations, a legitimate constituent action? The answer to this question cannot lie in the
law itself. 72The legal system reduces issues of justice to the “binary code” of
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legality/illegality, but the social world is far more complex than this binary. Teubner
states, “justice needs then to be understood as the subversive practices of law's self
transcendence.”73 Some of the actions such as occupations of public spaces, however
were at least initially viewed as “illegal” from the point of view of the law but
nevertheless were accomplished with the intention of pursuing what was perceived by the
movement as constitutionally guaranteed rights to the common. In light of the mass
corruption in government and the very strong reaction of oppositional forces in
transforming some of the most important constitutional features of our system without
democratic consent, tactics such as occupation, as means of renewing constituent power
and achieving justice, have been necessary to rectify an extremely unjust situation.
III. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE COMMONS FROM BELOW V.
TOP DOWN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
The current decline of State sovereignty, not only in the periphery but even at the
very center of the capitalist system, suggests that maintaining (and expanding at the
global level) a liberal constitutional model simply will recreate the conditions for
continuous accumulation of power and wealth through what can only be understood as a
process of continuous enclosure of sovereignty. As Jim Tully describes, “The systems of
transnational law, especially trade law, function as 'constitutions' in the sense that they
subordinate national constitutions, that is, treats national constitutions as legal regimes
under their jurisdiction (first order rules in H.L.A. Hart's sense) and open them to free
trade.”74
The top down economic constitutionalism of the World Bank, WTO, and in the context
of Europe, in what has been dubbed as the troika; have subordinated state governments to
implement neo liberal reform not only in the periphery, in the form of structural
adjustment programs, but at the very heart of the West, in the form of austerity measures.
This section analyzes the supranational constitutional process and considers the beni
comuni movement as part of an oppositional global constituency of social movements. In
this context, we apply the theory of societal constitutionalism proposed by Gunther
Teubner poses it, the question is: “Is it lawful to apply the distinction between lawful and unlawful to the
world?” He answers, “Thus, as soon as the law encounters its own paradox, then it is exposed to the
question of justice.” Justice, and not law, must be the standard by which to judge what forms of constituent
power and which constituent actions are legitimate. Teubner describes this process as an “ongoing
discursive process within the legal practice itself” which can include actions of those outside of the legal
profession, including citizen's protests. Luhmann describes the relationship of justice to the law as law's
contingency formula, he says “Justice can only mean an adequate complexity of consistent decisionmaking.” This does not mean that justice is found only within the consistency of legal decision as Teubner
describes, “Justice as law's contingency formula explicitly goes beyond internal consistency. It is located at
the boundary between the law and its external environment and means both the historical variability of
justice and its dependency on this environment.”).
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Teubner or as the Zapatistas call the concept of “one world in many worlds.” Can a
societal constitutionalism of the commons from below mount a challenge to the economic
constitutionalism imposed from above by such actors like the IMF and WTO?
A. Economic Constitutionalism Beyond the State
A number of scholars,75 have answered the challenge of articulating a theory of
constitutionalism beyond the state: “This approach views constitutionalism as a
continuum, and constitutionalisation as the process by which various entities acquire
constitutional characteristics.”76 Many scholars have applied this analysis to make the
case that “economic constitutionalism” is taking place within and by economic
institutions like the WTO and EU.77 While the WTO has neither a democratic legislature
nor court, it generates law in the form of soft law, resulting in non binding decisions,
which are enforced by stron states on weaker ones under the threat of political and/or
economic retaliation. Similarly, the states of the European Union, while far from ratifying
a political constitution, are bound by the laws of the European Union Law. The
European Union operates as a supranational body with a “quasi-federalist” ethos, and
while careful not to explicitly overstep the state sovereignty of its member states, exerts
economic pressure blatantly through the European Central Bank, imposing a defacto
hierarchy of European law over state law, as demonstrated above in the example of the
Monti technical government in Italy.
Both in the case of the WTO and European Union, there are clearly problems in
making the claim that these organizations constitute “economic constitutionalism,”
though they exhibit many constitutional features, such as “plausible claims to
sovereignty, jurisdictional scope, tenets of citizenship and modes of representation.”78
The most effective critique leveled at this constitutional claim is that these organizations
fails in one crucial respect, the lack of democratic representation, resulting in lack of
accountability, and the exclusion of non western and non state actors. Membership in
these organizations is open only to states, and as we analyzed in the Italian case,
representative democracy is failing at the state level, and thus representation by states in
the WTO and European Union is similarly tainted by extension, resulting in state
representatives often working against the interests of its own people. Furthermore,
membership in these organizations requires that member states accept and facilitate the
free market ideology which underpins their projects, often favoring western nations at the
disadvantage of the Global South. As a solution to these critiques, many scholars are
promoting constitutional pluralism, calling for broader inclusion of nonwestern states and
non-governmental actors as constituents.79 A pluralist and open vision of
constitutionalism would consider the multiple forms constituents may take outside of the
liberal constitutional form and traditional politics. In this spirit, Buchanan promotes
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social movements as a positive counter-hegmonic force to the constituent power of
western states and describes how they are producing a "discursive interface between
international organizations and a global citizenry" capable of "monitor(ing) policy
making in these institutions, .... bring(ing) citizens concerns into their deliberations and
empower(ing) marginalized groups so that they too may participate effectively in global
politics."80 Similar to the way in which social movements, through transnational advocacy
networks, are able to put local communities directly in contact with multinationals as
discussed in the Uwa case, social movements may also mediate the relationship between
economic institutions like the WTO and civil society. Buchanan along with many others,
however argue that social movements are far from being representative of “the peoples”
interests. She critiques the way in which these counter movement has been primarily led
by NGOs, and the similar problems they have to governmental actors such as agendas
driven by the west under the guise of representing Global South or “subaltern” interests,
resulting often in regulations and institutions very similar to the WTO and EU themselves
because they embrace the same “development” and “efficiency” rhetoric as their
counterparts. Third world approaches scholars like Rajagopal and Mukua Mutua are
referring to this move as the NGOization of social movements. Mutua for example points
out the incestuous origins of many of these NGOs: sharing often the same founders and
governing boards as one another, all being white, male, from the West and educated in
US Ivy League Schools.81 Like Buchanan, Marti Koskenniemi argues for pluralism in the
economic constitutional process, but similarly points out the striking “homogeneity of the
cultural and professional outlook” of those participants involved on both sides, offering
the same legal and technical solutions.82 In this context, the commons social movement
may offer some hope in providing the legitimacy that social movements have lost through
this “NGOization” effect.
Commons movements tend to demand representation by those who are actually
part of the movement. Often members are extremely suspicious about foreign funders
and outside organizers and even reject them where they know it will undermine their
local legitimacy.83 Furthermore, as discussed in a previous section, social movements
may be more capable of challenging existing institutions and offering true alternatives
because they are made up of civil society actors rather than professionals and may
provide the much needed institutional “imagination” necessary to providing true
alternatives for example to private property. They may offer new imagination in the
sense of functioning alternative reconfigurations of property, new or traditional
communal forms of property that promote cooperation in sharing scare resources thus
broadening access to these resources for the local people who depend on them. As one
commons scholar Lee Anne Fennell put it, “A resource arrangement that works in
practice can work in theory.”84 Commons communities rather than offering rhetoric are
offering tested best practices, which not only challenge the policies of top down
economic actors theoretically but empirically. The local and practice oriented nature of
common movements may provide the much needed legitimacy and imagination to social
movements as counter consitutents, which NGOs lack, in challenging and limiting top
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down economic constitutionalism unveling technocratic “economic” decisions taken from
above as political decisions where values like justice, as opposed to “efficiency” and
“development,” have renewed relevance.
B. Societal Constitutionalism of the Commons
Constitutional approaches beyond the nation state can be used to describe the
economic constitutionalism taking place from “above” but they can also provide us with
tools to understand constitutional processes taking place “from below” in civil society.
They can also be used to describe the “societal constitutionalism” within social
movements, like the commons movements, taking place rather than “beyond” the state,
“below the radar.” Commons movements have real value not only in the sense that they
are mobilizing civil society actors to fight against corporations and the capitalist system
which exploits them, but also in sharing the experiences of successful community
resource governance. As Michael Hardt explained in an interview, while the previous
alter-globalization movements were nomadic, functional to mapping the nodes of
economic power from the G8 to Seattle, Washington, Genoa; current occupation
movements in contrast, which share the same fight again corporate greed and the
negative effects of capitalism, are rooted in time and space for longer periods of time
which presents new opportunities for organization and alternative forms of governance.85
In fact, many commons communities in the commons movement as discussed above,
especially throughout the Global South, rather than forming only to protests like the
occupy movement, are in fact the traditional form of resource governance under threat by
state and corporate powers. The political economy scholarship of those like Elinor
Ostrom have analyzed the commons in terms of “institutional design,” and commons
property scholars, have shown that the commons themselves are systems of regulation;
drawing upon both formal and informal sources of law, which determine the use, transfer
and expropriation of common resources.86 While this scholarship on commons uses the
language of “design” as opposed to “societal constitutionalism,” both approaches
similarly analyze civil society as a site for politics and sources of law and regulation.
Civil constitutions are formed in underground evolutionary processes of long duration in which the
juridification of social sectors also incrementally develops constitutional norms, although they
remain as it were embedded in the whole set of legal norms. In the nation-state, the glare of the
political constitution has been so blinding that the individual constitutions of the civil sectors have
not been visible, or at best have appeared as part of political constitutions. 87

Taking this “societal constitutional” approach, the commons, as has been argued
by other scholars about other civil society organizations like labor unions, consumer
associations, environmental associations, and digital regulation communities, are not only
potentially contributing to a larger political constitutional process on national and
supranational levels, but are also engaged as constituents in their own civil constitutional
85

Saki Bailey and Tommaso Dotti, Occupying the Commons: Teatro Valle Occupato Documentary
(2012) available: http://www.commonssense.it/
86
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). See also Elinor Ostrom, Community and the Endogenous Solution
of Commons Problems, 4 J. OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 343, 344-45 (1992).
87
Teubner, supra note 9 p.

processes, acquiring constitutional characteristics through their practices. Law and law
making in this context takes place outside the designated liberal constitutional forms of
law creation og legislatures and courts, and rather exhibit constitutional features produced
by the internal regulations and governance institutions from within the associations
themselves. While, it would be beyond the scope of the paper to explore the potentially
constitutional features of each sub organization of the larger beni comuni movement in
Italy (water, theater, labor, education, nature)88, to give just one example the Teatro
Valle, much like the occupy movement, operates using the decision making method of
the “General Assembly” where decisions on programming, direction, funding, etc. are
made by “consensus” rather than by majority. Some of these meetings can go on for
hours, even a whole day, but the organization is committed to the procedural rule that
everyone must agree. While there is often disagreement and not always is agreement
wholehearted, the procedural rule commits the community to a deliberative process
where all viewpoints, even the most marginal are considered before a final decision.
While the most marginal views are rarely adopted, the opportunity to air them transforms
not only the substance of the decisions in form but also in quality, producing intense
commitment from a broader group of community members to implement and sustain the
decisions taken.89 In fact many commons scholars have noted similar deliberative
processes in other commons communities and such procedural structuring rules have
been linked to the effectiveness of these communities to manage resources in a long
lasting and sustainable way.
In a debate, which took place last year between Antonio Negri and Gunther
Teubner,90 Teubner poses the very question “Where is the potential space for social
movements in its relation to global governance?” The point of intellectual tension
between Negri and Teubner seem clearly to be the issue of characterization of the
“private” as “private property” and the danger of the “common” replacing the “public.”
While the “common” seeks to overcome the alienation of the private via collective activities and
collective modes of attribution, the “public” tends to strengthen the space of open and democratic
deliberation, which finds its different forms in each social field. Undoubtedly, common property
has a powerful potential, which has been suppressed under the domination of neo-liberal policies
of private property. But the choice between different attributions of property rights cannot be
decided a priori on theoretical grounds in favor of the commons, but needs to be governed by
public reflection processes within each sphere of life.91

Would a turn to the “common” promote a regression into local tribalism,
operating, as explained by property scholar Carol Rose, as a commons “inside” but as
private property “outside,”92 effectively excluding users outside of the community to the
resources controlled within. There is certainly the danger that autonomy of the common
from the private can result in the exclusion of the public. If we view the commons social
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movement as engaged in subversive practices of law's self transcendence through its
counter hegemonic uses of the law, then whether the commons can remain “just” in their
overthrow of the binary will depend on their ability “to thematise the restrictedness of
their specialized perspective and to infer self limitations for their expansionist course of
action.”93 The idea of a social constitutionalism of the commons is this very concept of
the self limitation of the commons movement in their effort to limit the expansionist
course of the economic sphere and collusive state and market actors over the societal
sphere. The idea is not just to promote a plurality of actors but a plurality of civil
constitutions. “The outcome is a multiplicity of independent global villages, each
developing an intrinsic dynamic of their own as autonomous functional areas, which
cannot be controlled through the outside.”94 Nancy Fraser promotes a similar idea with
her concept of “subaltern counterpublics” as “parallel discursive arenas where members
of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses, which in turn
permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and
needs.”95 Activist Naomi Klein suggests the Zapatistas version:
The Zapatistas have a phrase for this. They call it “one world with many worlds in it”. Some have
criticized this as a New Age non-answer. They want a plan. “We know what the market want to
do with those spaces, what do you want to do? Where's your scheme?” I think we shouldn't be
afraid to say: “That's not up to us.” We need to have some trust in people's ability to rule
themselves, to make the decisions that are best for them. We need to show some humility where
now there is so much arrogance and paternalism. To believe in human diversity and local
democracy is anything but wishy-washy. Everything in McGovernment conspires against them.
Neoliberal economics is biased at every level towards centralization, consolidation,
homogenization. It is a war waged on diversity. Against it, we need a movement of radical
change, committed to a single world with many worlds in it, that stands for “the one no and the
many yesses.”

The commons movement as a transnational social movement as opposed to
isolated cases of commons communities may present exactly this type of movement:
where local communities focused on defending local interests and common resources are
linked with a global movement of many autonomous commons. This transnational social
movement of the commons provides engagement between the many worlds and the
interaction serves not only to limit the possibly destructive tendencies of each site of
societal constitutionalism, but contributes to a truly bottom up deliberative process to
challenge the top down imposition of economic constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
The beni comuni common goods movement in Italy is a powerful example of the way in
which social movements are emerging as the new “pouvoir constituent” in a top down
and undemocratic process of economic constitutionalism. They are proving on both
national and supranational levels that civil society actors are a potent source of
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constituent power to both enforce national constitutional protections of the public through
counter hegemonic uses of the law and also at the transnational level where they are
forming global networks capable of not only negotiating with corporate power directly
but also to influence the top down economic constitutionalism of such actors like the
WTO and “troika.” Social movements are expanding our notion of the public sphere and
politics giving new meaning to the slogal “the personal is political.” Commons social
movements are not only sites of political protest but also sites of societal
constitutionalism, producing alternative forms of resource governance and management,
which provide not just theoretical but empirical challenges to the assumption of private
property and the developmental state which underpins the liberal constitutional form. In
order to promote a truly pluralist and open vision of constitutionalism which renews the
constituent power of the multitude, there must be full recognition that the two
fundamental institutions of current capital accumulation, the sovereign State and
corporate private ownership, which share a model of concentration of power and of
exclusion that has incrementally squeezed the public interest outside of constitutional law
by an imbalance favoring the guarantees of private property over those of democracy.
Thus restoration of the democratic constitutional fabric is a constituent action as long as
the direct and physical struggle for the commons is rooted in a democratic practice of a
multitude and can point at a constitutional text or fundamental principle capable of
restoring the interest of the people over that of the profit. In Italy for instance, such text is
clearly available in a number of highly advanced and mostly unimplemented (Art. 9 and
art 43) provisions of the 1948 Constitution, most fundamentally in Article 3 and Article
42. Clearly the constituent struggle for the commons aims at interrupting the path of
constitutional transformation that has been initiated by neo-liberalism and that in Italy has
reached the textual level. The constituent struggle for the commons, for the time being, is
more contextual than textual and aims at producing a new common sense by exposing the
contradictions of the state-private property dualism that colonized the modern imaginary.
There can be no constituent effort, nor liberation from corporate greed, outside of a
radical critique of private property rights. A social movement of many worlds many sites
of societal constitutionalism of the commons offers new hope for a truly bottom up
constitutional and deliberative process capable of reinvigorating the concepts of
“constituent power” and “popular sovereignty” to reverse the progressive transfer from
the commons to the private, both at national and global levels.

